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VII. WumanKinder: An EarthSphere Transition in Individuality

6. Our Holosymbiotic Personal Selves

Rossi, Ernest. The Unseen Order of the Self-Organizing Psyche. Psychological Perspectives. No. 32, 1995. A psychiatrist and author extols the conceptual expansion of psychological science by virtue of complex system science.

Schiepek, Gunter. Complexity and Nonlinear Dynamics in Psychotherapy. European Review. 17/2, 2009. From the Paracelsus Medical University in Salzburg, an approach to a 21st century re-evaluation, via in this case synergetics, of a person’s lifelong psychic development or lack thereof as set in their social context. Consider with VanDerHeide and Coburn below. Wherein, as usual, hats are tipped to Sigmund and to Charles, but we must really now move beyond and forward.

For human development processes, human change and learning processes, the dynamics and prognosis of mental disorders, problems manifesting in social systems such as couples, families, teams, or the question of how psychotherapy works, self-organization is ubiquitous. In the context of self-organization, complexity is a quality of changing patterns and patterns of change, produced by nonlinear coupled systems. (331)

Seeley, William and Bruce Miller. Disorders of the Self in Dementia. Feinberg, Todd and Julian Keenan, eds. The Lost Self. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005. The chapter begins by observing that selfhood arises in personal ontogeny by the same, recapitulated path as it does in evolution. A person is constantly engaged with and striving for the attainment of a narrative, temporal, core, or minimal identity, which is primarily located in the right brain.

We experience the self as a unified whole, yet self-representation by the brain requires an interconnected hierarchy of parts that can be selectively dismantled by neurological disease. (147) Human self-awareness is built upon layered and distributed but separable neural systems. These self-representations are rooted in the right hemisphere and are designed to address all human needs, from mundane to sublime. (160)

Siegel, Daniel. The Developing Mind. New York: Guilford Press, 1999. An authoritative work on brain development in children, with an emphasis on a sequential cycle of hemispheric lateralization and the activity of complex systems. As our psychological life unfolds we seek an “integrating self” to be achieved by “coherent narratives” which can make sense of the extant world and one’s own identity.

Siegfried, Tom. Self as Symbol. Science News. February 11, 2012. The science writer and editor reviews the latest neuroscience and consciousness studies, with a focus on Douglas Hofstadter and Christof Koch, to offer an insightful, popular summary. “At its core consciousness is self-referential awareness, the self’s sense of its own existence. It is consciousness itself that is trying to explain consciousness.” Everyday sentience is seen as tracked and informed by relative knowledge as we endeavor to affirm our own selves, and make sense of the world. In such regard, could we people seem as that phenomenon by which a “self-referential” universe, as if a vision quest, is trying to witness, comprehend, and discover itself?

It turned out that with genes, their physical implementation didn’t really matter as much as the information storage and processing that genes engaged in. DNA is in essence a map, containing codes allowing one set of molecules to be transcribed into others necessary for life. It’s a lot easier to make a million copies of a map of Texas than to make a million Texases; DNA’s genetic mapping power is the secret that made the proliferation of life on Earth possible. Similarly, consciousness is deeply involved in representing information (with symbols) and putting that information together to make sense of the world. It’s the brain’s information processing powers that allow the mind to symbolize itself.

Smith, Roger. Being Human: Historical Knowledge and the Creation of Human Nature. New York: Columbia University Press. 2007. A Lancaster University historian of science provides a cogent survey of who do we think we are from Renaissance humanism through Western philosophy to today’s frontiers. In such regard, a novel surmise is then made. By way of the latest complexity theories of autopoietic systems, human beings are ultimately seen to form, organize, imagine, and create themselves. Which insight would fit nicely into a self-discovering cosmic genesis.

Stewart, John, et al, eds. Enaction: Toward a New Paradigm for Cognitive Science. Cambridge, MIT Press, 2011. A consummate volume from the “neurophenomenology” perspective, most due to Francisco Varela and Evan Thompson, with a diverse, international cadre of authors including Michel Le Van Quyen, Maxine Sheets-Johnstone, Linda Smith, and Rafael Nunez. See especially Stewart’s introduction “Foundational Issues in Enaction as a Paradigm for Cognitive Science: From the Origin of Life to Consciousness and Writing.” I have heard Varela speak a number of times, first in 1979 in New York City when he had recently emigrated from Chile, at a Lindisfarne lecture arranged by William Irwin Thompson. But I wonder whether we just “lay down a path by walking,” enaction’s mantra, sans prior representations, or necessarily employ both contingent creativity within an essential, remembered guidance.

The proposed paradigm, enaction, offers an alternative to cognitive science's classical, first-generation Computational Theory of Mind (CTM). Enaction, first articulated by Varela, Thompson, and Rosch in The Embodied Mind (MIT Press, 1991), breaks from CTM's formalisms of information processing and symbolic representations to view cognition as grounded in the sensorimotor dynamics of the interactions between a living organism and its environment. A living organism enacts the world it lives in; its embodied action in the world constitutes its perception and thereby grounds its cognition. Some chapters offer manifestos for the enaction paradigm; others address specific areas of research, including artificial intelligence, developmental psychology, neuroscience, language, phenomenology, and culture and cognition. Three themes emerge: the relation between first-person lived experience and third-person natural science; the ambition to provide an encompassing framework applicable at levels from the cell to society; and the difficulties of reflexivity. (Book Synopsis)

Thagard, Paul. The Self as a System of Multilevel Interacting Mechanisms. Philosophical Psychology. 27/2, 2014. To transcend either reductionist or holistic methods for cognitive science, the prolific University of Waterloo, Canada, psychologist recommends a fluid stratified definition of an individual from molecular depths to neural anatomies, behavioral features, and social contexts. See also his chapter “Mapping Minds across Cultures” in Sun, Ron, ed. Grounding Social Sciences in Cognitive Sciences (MIT Press, 2012).

This paper proposes a theory of the self as a multilevel system consisting of social, psychological, neural, and molecular mechanisms. This account provides integrated explanations of many phenomena concerning how people represent, control, and change themselves. The multilevel system theory of the self provides a scientific alternative to transcendental and deflationary views favored by philosophers. The paper identifies more than sixty aspects of the self that divide naturally into nine groups, and provides multilevel accounts of one representative from each: self-concepts, self-consciousness, self-deception, self-presentation, self-criticism, self-esteem, self affirmation, self-regulation, and self-development. (Abstract)

My account of the self is radically different from most philosophical approaches, which tend to be either transcendental or deflationary. Transcendental views, held by philosophers such as Plato, Aquinas, Descartes, and Kant, take selves as supernatural entities – souls – that are not open to mechanistic explanation using the methods of natural science. At the other, deflationary extreme, some philosophers have been skeptical of the idea of the self as a determinate kind of thing, proposing instead that the self is just a bundle of perceptions, a convenient fiction amounting to a “center of negative gravity” (Dennett), or simply a myth. (3)

So who are you? My answer is that a self – a person – is a complex system operating at four levels, each of which consists of an EPIC subsystem composed of environment, parts, interconnections, and changes. Each level includes mechanism consisting of networks of parts whose interactions produce regular changes. Because the interactions in these subsystems typically involve nonlinear dynamics resulting from feedback loops that magnify effects of small differences in initial conditions, the behaviors of such mechanisms are often hard to predict. (42)

The justification for adopting the multilevel system view of the self is that it is superior to alternative accounts in explaining a wide range of phenomena concerning human behavior. Unlike transcendental views of the self as a supernatural soul, the multilevel view understands the self as a natural but highly complex kind of entity, like a state, university, living body, organ or molecule. Unlike deflationary views of the self as a fiction, multilevelism maintains that a scientific concept of the self has sufficiently broad explanatory power to justify belief in selves akin to belief in atoms, viruses, fields, genes, organizations, and other important theoretical entities posited by successful sciences. (42-43)

Toates, Frederick. Evolutionary Psychology – Towards a More Integrative Model. Biology and Philosophy. 20/2-3, 2005. An attempt to sort through this contentious subject in search of a necessary understanding of the valid primate and animal sources of human behavior.

Tschacher, Wolfgang and J.-P. Dauwalder, eds. Dynamics, Synergetics, Autonomous Agents: Nonlinear Systems Approaches to Cognitive Psychology and Cognitive Science. Singapore: World Scientific, 1999. Many technical papers on the cross-fertilization and advance of these disciplines by the various dimensions of nonlinear science.

Tschacher, Wolfgang and Otto Rossler. The Self: A Processual Gestalt. Chaos, Solitons & Fractals. 7/7, 1996. Conceptual reasons for the evolutionary ascent of personal identity founded upon the dynamics of self-organizing systems.

Uddin, Lucina, et al. The Self and Social Cognition. Trends in Cognitive Sciences. 11/4, 2007. A team including Julian Keenan reports that the frontoparietal network of the right-lateralized brain hemisphere is vital to achieve self-representation and personal self-recognition. We continue to emphasize this finding for such an integral feminine perception will be indispensable if a bicameral humankind might ever be able to heal and become whole itself.

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